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a b s t r a c t 
Electrical power grids are vulnerable to cascading failures that can lead to large blackouts. 
The detection and prevention of cascading failures in power grids are important problems. 
Currently, grid operators mainly monitor the states (loading levels) of individual compo- 
nents in a power grid. The complex architecture of a power grid, with its many interdepen- 
dencies, makes it difficult to aggregate the data provided by local components in a mean- 
ingful and timely manner. Indeed, monitoring the resilience of an operational power grid to 
cascading failures is a major challenge. 
This paper attempts to address this challenge. It presents a robustness metric based on 
the topology and operative state of a power grid to quantify the robustness of the grid. Also, 
it presents a distributed computation method with self-stabilizing properties that can be 
used for near real-time monitoring of grid robustness. The research thus provides insights 
into the resilience of a dynamic operational power grid to cascading failures during real- 
time in a manner that is both scalable and robust. Computations are pushed to the power 
grid network, making the results available at each node and enabling automated distributed 
control mechanisms to be implemented. 
© 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1. Introduction 
Power grids are major critical infrastructure assets—all kinds
of basic, government and private services depend on the con-
tinuous and reliable delivery of electricity. Power grid outages
can have significant societal impacts in terms of human safety
and economic losses. 
The large-scale introduction of renewable energy sources
and the current (centralized) architecture of the power grid
increase the likelihood of power outages. Encouraged by gov-
ernment subsidies and the trend to become more “green,”con-∗ Corresponding author . 
E-mail address: m.e.warnier@tudelft.nl (M. Warnier). 
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Please cite this article as: Martijn Warnier et al., Distributed monitori
grids, International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection (2017),sumers are becoming producers of electricity by installing so-
lar panels and wind mills [29] . Part of this produced power will
be used locally, but excess power will be fed into the power
grid. This contributes to grid instability [47] because it is diffi-
cult to predict and, thus, balance electricity production when
power is supplied by a large number of small producers spread
over a large geographical region, instead of a few large produc-
ers. 
Unfortunately, the current power grid architecture does not
support the large-scale introduction of small producers [1] .
This significantly increases the possibility of a major power
grid failure—initial local disruptions spread to the rest of
a grid, evolving into a system-wide outage [10] . An initial
failure can be caused by an external event such as a stormng for the prevention of cascading failures in operational power 
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rnd the failure effects can spread to the rest of the network in 
ifferent ways, including voltage and frequency instabilities,
idden failures of protection systems, software and operator 
rrors, and line overloads. 
For example, a large-scale outage can be initiated by an 
verloaded line that is “tripped” by a circuit breaker. At this 
oint, electricity can no longer flow through the line and the 
ower flows to other lines. This can overload some of the lines,
ausing them to be tripped as well. As this process repeats 
ver and over again, more and more lines are shut down, lead- 
ng to a cascading failure of the power grid [13,39] . This paper 
ocuses on cascading effects created by line overloads and on 
reventing cascading failures. 
In order to detect (and ultimately prevent) cascading fail- 
res, it is necessary to monitor and alter the current state 
power load distribution) of a power grid. The emerging smart 
rid is designed to do exactly this—it leverages a communi- 
ations overlay that connects sensors and actuators. In effect,
 smart grid is a large-scale distributed system that monitors 
ine loads and accordingly changing the network state by trip- 
ing and untripping lines. 
This paper deals with a smart grid environment. It focuses 
n two principal research questions. The first question is: 
hat should be monitored? In other words, is there a met- 
ic that can predict cascading failures? The second question 
s: How should the grid be monitored? In other words, how 
hould aggregation be performed and what is the appropri- 
te temporal resolution for the monitoring? The extension of 
he resulting passive monitoring scheme to an active scheme 
hat automatically alters the state of a power grid to prevent 
ascading failures is a topic for future research. 
The main contribution of the paper is a new distributed 
onitoring approach that can be used to monitor the robust- 
ess of a power grid to cascading failures. The monitoring ap- 
roach is based on the distributed computation of the robust- 
ess metric introduced in [24,25] . The contributions also in- 
lude an extension of distributed gossip algorithms [9] with a 
elf-stabilization mechanism to account for network dynam- 
cs. The resulting framework enables distributed aggregates to 
e computed in a rapid and reliable manner; this is at the heart 
f the proposed power grid monitoring approach. 
The principal technical result is that it is possible to com- 
ute a complex robustness metric using simple, albeit robust,
istributed primitives in a manner that makes the results 
eadily available to every node in a power grid. The result is im- 
ortant because it enables the measurement infrastructure to 
e used in real-time to implement distributed control mecha- 
isms for a power grid. The convergence time scales very well 
logarithmic order) with respect to network size. The precision 
f the computations can be set by adjusting the message sizes 
nd is independent of network parameters such as the num- 
er of nodes and network diameter. 
. Robustness metric 
everal topological metrics have been proposed to express the 
ulnerability of a power grid to cascading failures. Examples 
nclude the average shortest path length, betweenness cen- Please cite this article as: Martijn Warnier et al., Distributed monitori
grids, International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection (2017),rality [15] and gap metric [14] . These metrics can be used to
etermine the most critical nodes in a power grid. 
However, in addition to its topological characteristics, a 
ower grid has a physical aspect. In particular, electrical cur- 
ent in a power grid behaves according to Kirchhoff’s laws [5] .
herefore, a metric that is used to quantify the robustness of 
n operational power grid to cascading failures should con- 
ider its topological and physical characteristics. 
The metric for robustness to cascading failures R CF 
24,25] does exactly this. It is, therefore, the starting point for 
he distributed power grid monitoring algorithm proposed in 
his paper. The robustness metric R CF assesses the robustness 
f a power grid to cascading failures caused by line overloads.
he metric relies on two main concepts: (i) electrical node ro- 
ustness; and (ii) electrical node significance. Higher values of 
he R CF metric indicate greater robustness, i.e., a power grid 
hat is able to resist cascading failures to a larger extent. The 
emainder of this section summarizes previous work on ro- 
ustness metrics. Interested readers are referred to [24,25] for 
dditional details about robustness metrics. 
.1. Electrical node robustness 
he electrical node robustness quantifies the ability of a bus 
i.e., a node in a graph representation of a power grid) to resist
ascading line overload failures by incorporating flow dynam- 
cs and network topology. Three key factors are used to calcu- 
ate this robustness value for a node: (i) homogeneity of the 
oad distribution on out-going branches (i.e., links in a graph 
epresentation of a power grid); (ii) loading level of the out- 
oing links; and (iii) out-degree of the node. 
Entropy is used to capture the first and third factors de- 
cribed above. The entropy of a load distribution at a node 
ncreases as flows over lines are distributed more homoge- 
eously and the node out-degree increases. The entropy of a 
iven load distribution at a node i is computed as: 
 i = −
d ∑ 
j=1 
p i j log p i j (1) 
here d is the out-degree of the corresponding node and p ij is 
he normalized flow value on the out-going link l ij . The nor- 
alized flow value p ij is computed as: 
p i j = 
f i j ∑ d 
j=1 f i j 
(2) 
here f ij is the flow value in line l ij . 
The effect of the loading level of the power grid is expressed 
sing the tolerance parameter α (see [34] ). The tolerance level 
ij of line l ij is the ratio of the rated limit to the load of line
 ij . The parameter α is commonly used to compensate for the 
ack of data on the rated limits of components in test systems 
44] . The analysis methods work such that, whenever the rated 
imits of grid components are known, the rated limits replace 
he α values. 
Eqs. (1) and (2) are combined with the tolerance parameter 
to capture the impact of the loading level on robustness. The 
esulting electrical robustness R n, i of a node i , which considers ng for the prevention of cascading failures in operational power 
 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijcip.2017.03.003 
international journal of critical infrastructure protection 000 (2017) 1–13 3 
ARTICLE IN PRESS 
JID: IJCIP [m7; April 24, 2017;15:20 ] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 both the flow dynamics and the topological effects on network
robustness, is given by: 
R n,i = −
d ∑ 
j=1 
αi j p i j log p i j (3)
The minus sign in Eq. (3) compensates for the negative elec-
trical node robustness value that occurs when taking the log-
arithm of the normalized flow value. Note that only the out-
degrees of nodes are considered in the formalization of electri-
cal node robustness. The in-degree relates to the total amount
of power flow to which a node can be exposed. In contrast, the
out-degree of the same node relates to its ability transfer the
power to the remainder of the network that has a relatively
larger rest capacity to accommodate the excess power flow.
Therefore, only the out-degree of a node is used to compute
the electrical node robustness. 
2.2. Electrical node significance 
All the nodes in a power grid do not have the same influence
on the occurrence of cascading failures. Some nodes distribute
a relatively large amount of the power in the network whereas
other nodes only distribute a small amount of power. When
a node (or line to a node) that distributes a relatively large
amount of power fails, the result is more likely to lead to a
cascading failure, ultimately resulting in a large grid blackout.
In contrast, if a node that distributes only a small amount of
power fails, then the resulting redistribution of power can usu-
ally be accommodated by other parts of the network. Thus,
node failures have different impacts on the robustness to cas-
cading failures and the impacts depend on the amount of
power distributed by the corresponding nodes. 
The impact of a node i is expressed by its electrical node
significance δi : 
δi = 
P i ∑ N 
j=1 P j 
(4)
where P i is the total power distributed by node i and N is the
number of nodes in the network. 
Electrical node significance is a centrality measure that
can be used to rank the relative importance (i.e., criticality)
of nodes in a power grid with respect to cascading failures.
Failures of nodes with higher δ values typically result in larger
cascading failures. 
2.3. Network robustness metric 
The network robustness metric R CF [24,25] is obtained by com-
bining the node robustness and node significance: 
R CF = 
N ∑ 
i =1 
R n,i δi (5)
The network robustness metric can be used as an indica-
tor of power grid robustness. This is accomplished by com-
puting the robustness metric for a normally-operating power
grid, which yields a value v . This value v is used as a basePlease cite this article as: Martijn Warnier et al., Distributed monitori
grids, International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection (2017),case. During normal operations, the robustness metric value
changes somewhat because different nodes demand different
amounts of electricity over time, leading to different loading
levels in the network. However, a larger change in the robust-
ness metric—a drop, in particular—indicates that a cascad-
ing failure is more likely and that power grid operators may
need to take evasive actions (e.g., by adding reserve capacity
to the grid or shifting power demand). Note that, in the gen-
eral case, it is complicated to determine a good safety margin
or the value of the robustness metric that corresponds to the
exact tipping point (i.e., point where a small failure leads to
a massive blackout). Ultimately, this needs to be determined
by grid operators; in particular, they must identify what they
consider to be acceptable and the appropriate safety margin. 
This research determines this point experimentally by sim-
ulating a specific power grid (IEEE 118 Power System [12] ) us-
ing the MATCASC tool [23] . However, this point needs to be
determined experimentally for other grids as well. Interested
readers are referred to [26,27] for a general and structured in-
vestigation of this topic. 
3. Decentralized aggregation 
Computing the robustness metric introduced in the previous
section in a centralized manner raises a number of challenges
when applied to large power grids that cover states, provinces
or countries. Scalability, single-point-of-failure, real-time re-
sults dissemination, fault tolerance and maintenance of ded-
icated hardware are some of the requirements that suggest a
decentralized approach over a centralized solution. 
The problem of interest is modeled as a geometric ran-
dom graph (mesh network) in which nodes mainly commu-
nicate with their immediate neighbors. The communications
model assumes that time is discrete. During a time step, each
node picks and communicates with a random neighbor. Ma-
jor updates in the network occur just once in a while; for ex-
ample, in the scenario of interest, new measurement data is
made available every 15 min. The time rounds concept is em-
ployed and nodes are required to update their local data at
the beginning of a round. The bootstrap problem and round-
based time models have received coverage in the literature
[6,19,35] . Since the constraints in the application scenario are
very loose, an algorithm like the one presented by Werner-
Allen et al. [41] may be used. 
Note that no assumptions are made about nodes stop-
failing or new nodes joining the network. In fact, the solution
described below can accommodate these situations and the
computations adapt to the changes. 
3.1. Solution outline 
The solution for computing the robustness metric uses a
primitive for calculating sums in a distributed network that
is inspired by the gossip-like mechanism presented in [32] .
The algorithm described in [32] computes a sum of values dis-
tributed on the nodes of a network using a property of order
statistics applied to a series of exponential random variables.
A formal description of this algorithm is given in Algorithm 2 .ng for the prevention of cascading failures in operational power 
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Algorithm 1: PropagateMinVal( v, τ ). 
1 ; /* v , τ - received value and time-to-live ; /* v local , 
τlocal - local value and time-to-live */ 
2 */ 
3 ; /* T - maximum time-to-live, constant value */ 
4 ; /* C - constant value, default to 0.5 */ 
5 ; /* create temporary variables */ 
6 (v m , v M ) ← ( min (v, v local ) , max (v, v local ) ) ; 
7 (τm , τM ) ← corresponding (τ, τlocal ) to (v m , v M ) ; 
8 ; /* update logic */ 
9 if v m == v M then 
10 if v m < 0 then /* equal negative values */ 
11 τm ← Cτm 
12 else /* equal positive values */ 
13 min (τm , τM ) ← max (τm , τM ) − 1 
14 else 
15 if v m < 0 then /* at least one negative value */ 
16 if v m == −v M then 
17 (τm , τM ) ← (T, T ) 
18 else 
19 (τm , τM ) ← (C τm , C τM ) 
20 else /* two different positive values */ 
21 τM ← τm − 1 
22 ; /* update local variables */ 
23 (v, v local ) ← (v m , v m ) ; 
24 (τ, τlocal ) ← corresponding (τm , τM ) ; 
T
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Algorithm 2: ComputeSum ( v, τ). 
1 ; /* v 0 - original random samples vector on this node 
*/ 
2 ; /* v, τ - received value and time-to-live vectors */ 
3 ; /* T - maximum time-to-live, constant value */ 
4 ; /* update all elements in the data vector */ 
5 for j = 1 to length (v) do 
6 PropagateMinVal (v[ j ] , τ[ j ]) 
7 ; /* time-to-live update - do once every timeslot */ 
8 for j = 1 to length (v) do 
9 if v[ j] == v 0 [ j] then /* reinforce a minimum */ 
10 τ[ j] ← T 
11 else 
12 τ[ j] ← τ[ j] − 1 ; /* decrease time-to-live */ 
13 if τ[ j] < = 0 then /* value expired */ 
14 v[ j] ← v 0 [ j] ; 
15 τ[ j] ← T 
16 ; /* estimate the sum of elements */ 
17 s ← 0 ; 
18 for j = 1 to length (v) do 
19 s ← s + abs (v[ j]) 
20 return length (v) /s 
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nhe algorithm resembles a gossip algorithm [19] , but differs in 
 number of important points. 
Essentially, the algorithm trades communications for con- 
ergence speed. By relying on the propagation of an extreme 
alue (minimum value in this case) that is locally computable,
t achieves the fastest possible convergence in a distributed 
etwork—O ( D log N ) time steps (where D is the network diam- 
ter and N is the number of nodes). This speed is significant 
ompared with the original gossip algorithms that converge 
n O ( D 2 log N ) time steps [9] . 
Fig. 1 illustrates the sum computation process under net- 
ork dynamics. A network with 1000 nodes is modeled as a 
eometric random graph with diameter 14 and initialized with 
andom values. Half of the network is disconnected at time 
tep 50 and the nodes change their values at time step 200.
he network values converge after 15 computation steps. 
The price paid is the increased message size O (δ−2 ) , where 
he parameter δ specifies the precision of the final result. As- 
uming that s is the ground-truth result, the algorithm of- 
ers an estimate in the interval [(1 − δ) s, (1 + δ) s ] with error
= O (1 /poly (N)) . 
The extreme value propagation mechanisms are extended 
o account for network dynamics. Specifically, a time-to-live 
eld is added to each value – the integer value decreases with 
ime and marks the age of the current value. This mechanism 
akes care of nodes leaving the network, stop-crashing or re- Please cite this article as: Martijn Warnier et al., Distributed monitori
grids, International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection (2017),etting. In the example in Fig. 1 , after convergence, half of the
odes in the network were removed at time step 50. The ef- 
ect of the expiring time-to-live (set to a maximum of 50 in 
he example) can be seen around time step 100. 
The time-to-live expiry mechanism is extended to achieve 
he removal of values in O (D log N + log T ) time steps. In other
ords, if a certain extreme value propagates through the net- 
ork, it is marked as “expired” and its associated time-to-live 
alue expires (i.e., reaches zero) within O (D log N + log T ) time
teps. This is shown in Fig. 1 during the interval 200–300. At 
ime step 200, half of the nodes in the network change their 
alues randomly, triggering the expiration mechanism. A for- 
al description of the extension is provided in Algorithm 1 . 
The distributed approach solves most of the scaling is- 
ues and is highly robust to network dynamics (e.g., network 
odes becoming unavailable due to failures, reconfiguration,
ew nodes joining the system, etc.). As shown below, the ap- 
roach is very fast for a typical network, significantly outper- 
orming centralized approaches. Because the protocols rely on 
nonymous data exchange, privacy concerns [30] are allevi- 
ted; in any case, the identities of the system nodes are not 
eeded in the computations. 
The disadvantages of the approach map to the known 
roperties of this class of epidemic algorithms. Although 
nonymity is preserved, an authentication system [20] is 
eeded to prevent malicious data from corrupting the compu- 
ations. Also, a light form of synchronization [41] is needed to 
oordinate nodes to report major changes to their local values.
learly, the choice of an appropriate synchronization mecha- 
ism must take security into account [37] . ng for the prevention of cascading failures in operational power 
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Fig. 1 – Sum computation process under network dynamics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3.2. Self-stabilizing sum computation 
The basic mechanism behind the sum computation algo-
rithm is minimum value propagation via gossiping. Assume
that each node holds a positive value x i . At each time step,
every node chooses a random neighbor and they exchange
their values, both the nodes keeping the smallest value.
The smallest value propagates rapidly in the network in
O ( D log N ) time steps via this push–pull gossiping mechanism
(see [36] ). Algorithm 2 presents a formal description of the self-
stabilizing sum computation. 
Assume that each node i in a network holds a positive
value x i . In order to compute the sum of all n values in the
network 
(∑ N 
i =1 x i 
)
, Mosk-Aoyama and Shah [32] propose that
each node holds a vector v of m values, initially drawn from
a random exponential random distribution with parameter
λi = x i . After a gossiping step between two nodes i and j , the
vectors v i and v j become equal, and hold the minimum value
in each position of the initial vectors. Thus, given an index
k ∈ (1, m ), the resulting vectors v ′ i , v ′ j have the property: 
v ′ i [ k ] = v ′ j [ k ] = min 
(
v i [ k ] , v j [ k ] 
)
(6)
Mosk-Aoyama and Shah [32] show that, after all the vectors
converge to some value v , the sum of x i values in the networkPlease cite this article as: Martijn Warnier et al., Distributed monitori
grids, International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection (2017),may be approximated as: 
N ∑ 
i =1 
x i = 
m ∑ m 
k =1 v[ k ] 
(7)
This work extends the algorithm presented in [32] by
adding, to each node, a new vector τi that holds a time-to-live
counter for each value. This new vector is initialized with a
default value T , larger than the convergence time of the origi-
nal algorithm (the choice of a proper value is explained below).
The values in τi decrease by one every time step, with one ex-
ception. The node generating the minimum v i [ k ] in position
k ∈ (1, m ) sets τi [ k ] to T (Line 10 in Algorithm 2 ). In the absence
of other dynamics, all the properties proved in [36] remain un-
changed because the output of the proposed approach is iden-
tical to the original algorithm. 
The main reason for adding the time-to-live field is to ac-
count for nodes leaving the network and nodes that fail-stop.
This eliminates the requirement that nodes must keep track of
their neighbors. Additionally, the proposed mechanism does
not make use of node identifiers. 
The intuition behind this mechanism is that a node that
generates the network-wide minimum in position k ∈ (1, m )
will always advertise it with the accompanying time-to-live
set to the maximum T . The remaining nodes adopt the value
v [ k ] and have a value τ[ k ] that decreases with distance fromng for the prevention of cascading failures in operational power 
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Table 1 – Value propagation. 
Propagation Ordering Previous Intermediate Final 
None u [ k ] < v i [ k ] < v ′ i [ k ] u [ k ] u [ k ] u [ k ] 
u [ k ] < v ′ i [ k ] < v i [ k ] u [ k ] u [ k ] u [ k ] 
Slow v i [ k ] < u [ k ] < v ′ i [ k ] v i [ k ] v i [ k ] u [ k ] 
v i [ k ] < v ′ i [ k ] < u [ k ] v i [ k ] v i [ k ] v 
′ 
i [ k ] 
Fast v ′ i [ k ] < u [ k ] < v i [ k ] u [ k ] v 
′ 
i [ k ] v 
′ 
i [ k ] 
v ′ i [ k ] < v i [ k ] < u [ k ] v i [ k ] v 
′ 
i [ k ] v 
′ 
i [ k ] 
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ahe original node. T is chosen to be larger than the maximum 
umber of gossiping steps it takes for the minimum to reach 
ny node in the network. In a gossiping step between nodes i 
nd j , if v i [ k ] = v j [ k ] , then the largest of τi [ k ] and τj [ k ] propa-
ate (Line 13 in Algorithm 1 ). This means that τ[ k ] on all nodes
s strictly positive as long as the node is online. If the node 
hat generates the minimum value in position k goes offline,
hen all the associated τ[ k ] values in the network steadily de- 
rease (Line 12 in Algorithm 2 ) until they reach zero and the 
inimum is replaced by next smallest value in the network 
Lines 13–15 in Algorithm 2 ). T time steps are required for the 
etwork to “forget” the value in position k . Fig. 1 shows the 
raphical impact of the O ( T ) mechanism during the interval 
0 to 150. 
The second self-stabilizing mechanism targets nodes that 
hange their values at runtime. Assume that a node changes 
ts value x i to x 
′ 
i at some time t . This change triggers a regen-
ration of its original samples from the exponential random 
ariable v i to v ′ i . Let k be an index with k ∈ (1, m ). Let u be the
ector containing the minimum values in the network if node 
 does not exist. In order to understand the change that occurs 
hen transitioning from x i to x 
′ 
i , it is necessary to consider 
he relationships between the individual values v i [ k ], v ′ i [ k ] and
 [ k ]. 
As seen in Table 1 , if u [ k ] is the smallest of all the values,
hen no change propagates in the network. If v ′ i [ k ] is the small-
st value, then it propagates rapidly – in O ( D log N ) time steps –
ith the basic extreme propagation mechanism. If v i [ k ] is the 
mallest value, then the value remains in the network until 
ts associated time-to-live field expires. Because T  D usu- 
lly holds, a mechanism is added to speed up the removal of 
his value from the network. 
The removal mechanism is triggered by the node owning 
he value that needs to be removed (node i in this case). This is 
ccomplished by node i marking the value v i [ k ] as “expired”by 
ropagating a negative value −v i [ k ] . This change does not af-
ect the extreme value propagation mechanism ( Algorithm 1 ) 
or the estimation of the sum (note the use of the absolute 
alue function in Line 19 in Algorithm 2 ). If node i contacts 
 node that also holds the value v i [ k ], then it propagates the
egative sign for the value and maximizes its time-to-live field 
o a large value T . Intuitively, as long as v i [ k ] is present in the
etwork, −v i [ k ] propagates, causing it to be overwritten. Con- 
idering the large range of unique floats or double numbers 
ersus the number of values in a network at a given time, it is 
afe to assume that the values in the network are unique. 
The time-to-live field of any negative value halves with 
ach gossiping step (for C = 0 . 5 ) if it does not meet the v i [ k ]
Please cite this article as: Martijn Warnier et al., Distributed monitori
grids, International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection (2017),alue (Lines 11, 19 in Algorithm 1 ). Intuitively, if a negative 
alue is surrounded by values other than v i [ k ], it propagates 
hile simultaneously canceling itself at an exponential rate.
his mechanism resembles a predator–prey model [2] where 
he predators are represented by −v i [ k ] and the prey by v i [ k ].
he mechanism is designed such that the populations cancel 
ach other, targeting the fixed point at the origin as the solu- 
ion for the accompanying Lotka–Volterra equations. 
emma 1 (Value removal delay) . When using the value re- 
oval algorithm, the new minimum propagates in the network in 
 (D log N + log T ) time steps. 
roof. In the worst case scenario, the entire network contains 
he minimum value v i [ k ] in position k , with the time-to-live
eld set to the maximum T . The negative value, being the 
mallest value in the network, propagates in O ( D log N ) in the
ntire network. Again, in the worst case scenario, each node in 
he network has the value −v i [ k ] in position k with the time-to-
ive set to the maximum T . From this moment on, the time-to- 
ive halves at each gossip step at each node (for C = 0 . 5 ), reach-
ng zero in the worst case scenario in O (log T ) time steps. This
s the worst case because nodes may be contacted by several 
eighbors during a time step leading to much faster cancel- 
ation. Overall, the removal mechanism is active for at most 
 (D log N + log T ) time steps. This bound is an upper bound. In
eality, the spread and cancellation mechanisms act in paral- 
el, leading to tighter bounds. 
Lemma 1 provides the basis for choosing the constant T .
deally, T should be as small as possible, in line with the di-
meter of the network. The fact that the removal mechanism 
s affected only by log T enables an overestimate of T to be
sed; the overestimate can be a few orders of magnitude larger 
han the diameter of the network with little impact on the 
onvergence speed. For example, if the network diameter is 
0 to 30 and the values refresh every 10,000 time steps, then 
 can be safely set to be anywhere in the range 1000–10,000 
see Section 4.3 ). This does not affect the convergence of the 
um computation mechanism, but it allows for timely node 
emoval. 
All the mechanisms presented in this section lead to 
he sum computation mechanism ComputeSum () presented in 
lgorithm 2 . It has the same properties as the original algo- 
ithm [32] , but it incorporates self-stabilization properties that 
ccount for network dynamics in the form of node removal 
nd nodes changing their values in batches. 
.3. Robustness metric computation 
he robustness metric comprises two terms that can be com- 
uted locally ( p i in Eq. (2) and R n, i in Eq. (3) ) and two that can
e computed in a distributed manner ( δi in Eq. (4) and R CF in
q. (5) ). In particular, Eq. (5) can be rewritten as: 
 CF = 
∑ N 
i =1 R n,i P i ∑ N 
j=1 P j 
(8) 
eading to a solution with two ComputeSum () algorithms in par- 
llel. The first algorithm computes 
∑ N 
i =1 R n,i P i while the second 
lgorithm computes 
∑ N 
j=1 P j . ng for the prevention of cascading failures in operational power 
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Fig. 2 – Actual demand profile in the Dutch transmission grid and two synthetically-generated demand profiles. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Characterizing the convergence time of the composition of
two distributed algorithms is a difficult task in general. For-
tunately, the composition of the two ComputeSum () algorithms
has a convergence time equal to each of the two algorithms,
leading to the same O (D log N + log T ) time steps complex-
ity. If the network is stabilized, then after the power distribu-
tions P i change, the values 
∑ N 
i =1 R n,i P i and 
∑ N 
j=1 P j stabilize in
O (D log N + log T ) in parallel, because they do not require in-
termediate results from each other. Because the gossip algo-
rithms used in this work are based on minimum value prop-
agation, all the nodes in the network have the same value af-
ter the algorithm converges. Stabilization is easily detected lo-
cally by monitoring the lack of changes in the propagated val-
ues for a fixed time threshold. 
4. Analysis and discussion 
The proposed approach for computing the robustness met-
ric is scalable and robust. This section focuses on some of
quantitative aspects and analyzes the results obtained from
simulations based on synthetic and real data. The computer
code implementing the proposed approach was implemented
in Matlab and C++. In all the simulations, the network nodes
were deployed in a square area. Their communications ranges
were varied to obtain the desired value of the network diam-
eter. Networks made up of several independent clusters were
discarded. Please cite this article as: Martijn Warnier et al., Distributed monitori
grids, International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection (2017),4.1. Data generation 
No public data is available that describes the structure and
changes in load over time for a power grid. Therefore, data
was generated in order to demonstrate the effectiveness of the
proposed approach. 
Computing the robustness of a power grid requires data
describing its topology (i.e., interconnections of nodes with
lines), electrical properties of its components (i.e., admittance
values of transmission lines), information about its nodes (i.e.,
number and their types) and their generation and load values.
The IEEE Power Systems Test Case Archive [12] provides all this
data. In particular, the IEEE 118 Power System maintained in
the archive provides a realistic representation of a real-world
power transmission grid comprising 118 nodes and 141 trans-
mission lines. The IEEE 118 system is used in this work as the
reference power grid. 
The IEEE 118 Power System includes information about the
topology of the power grid. The loading profile provided with
the grid topology gives a representative load for the network,
but only for one moment in time. However, in practice, the
topology of a power grid is generally unchanged over time (ex-
cept for grid maintenance, failures and extensions) while the
generation/loading profiles vary over time. The changing na-
ture of the loading profile and, accordingly, the generation pro-
file result in varying robustness over time. Therefore, simulat-
ing the robustness profile of a power grid over 1 day requires
a demand profile for the entire day. ng for the prevention of cascading failures in operational power 
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Fig. 3 – Convergence of the network starting from a clean state. 
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dTo vary the robustness of the IEEE 118 system, 10% of the 
ower generation nodes were randomly chosen to be fed with 
ynthetic (generated) demand profiles. The demand values of 
he other power generation nodes remained unchanged. The 
emand profiles were generated based on the actual load pro- 
le of the Dutch grid on January 29, 2006. The demands at the 
orresponding points in the Dutch grid were sampled every 
5 min over the entire day. 
Fig. 2 shows the actual demand profile at a point in the 
utch transmission grid and two synthetically-generated de- 
and profiles. Each synthetic demand profiles was generated 
y introducing random noise to the actual demand profile and 
moothing the curve using a moving average [21] with a win- 
ow size of 10. 
.2. Influence of communications topology 
he communications network underlying a smart grid can be 
mplemented in a number of ways, each mapping to a possi- 
ly different communications topology. For example, an Inter- 
et backbone model that allows any-to-any communications 
n the network could be chosen, leading to a fully-connected 
raph. 
In the first experiment, the network was modeled as a ge- 
metric random graph with its nodes initialized with ran- 
om values, and the time taken for the aggregated sum to 
onverge to the same value on all the nodes was recorded.Please cite this article as: Martijn Warnier et al., Distributed monitori
grids, International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection (2017),ig. 3 shows that the fastest aggregate computation occurs in 
 fully-connected network. 
In the second experiment, the network was again modeled 
s a geometric random graph with its nodes initialized with 
andom values. However, after the network stabilized, the val- 
es of half of the nodes were changed to different values. The 
ime taken for the network to stabilize after this change was 
ecorded. As expected, Fig. 4 shows that a fully-connected net- 
ork stabilizes the fastest after a disruption. 
These results assume that the Internet backbone works 
erfectly and is able to route the large amount of gener- 
ted traffic. A more realistic scenario is that the data collec- 
ion points obtain data from the individual consumers via 
ome radio technology (e.g., GPRS modems) that are them- 
elves connected to the Internet backbone. To keep the traf- 
c in the network to a minimum, the data collection points 
nly communicate with their first-order network neighbors,
orresponding to a mesh network deployment. As seen in 
igs. 3 and 4 , the diameter of the network clearly has a ma-
or impact on the results; this confirms the theoretical con- 
ergence results. The information needs at least O ( D ) time 
teps to propagate through the network. The constant in the 
 () notation is influenced by the average network connec- 
ivity (a node can only contact a single neighbor per time 
tep, slowing information dissemination) and by the push–
ull communications model (a node may be contacted by sev- 
ral neighbors during a time step, speeding up information 
issemination). ng for the prevention of cascading failures in operational power 
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 4.3. Scalability aspects 
One of the main characteristics of the proposed approach is
that the algorithm scales very well with the number of nodes
in the network. As seen in Figs. 3 and 4 , the number of nodes
has little influence on the final results (influencing only as
O (log N )). 
However, the simulations investigated cases where the
number of nodes was varied over four orders of magnitude
and the results hint that boundaries tighter than those pro-
posed in this paper may exist. The results reveal that, in the
case of a fully-connected network, the recovery time varies
34% between a network with 1000 nodes and one with 100,000
nodes, while the variation drops to just 2.4% for a 20-hop net-
work varying from 1000 nodes to 100,000 nodes. 
These results are very important for smart grid applica-
tions. Because the network is linked to a physical space (a
country or, in general, a region) and fully covers the space, the
diameter of the network is expected to, at most, decrease with
the addition of new nodes. Intuitively, when thinking of nodes
as devices with a fixed transmission range, adding more de-
vices in the same region may lead to shorter paths. The aggre-
gate computation approach proposed in this paper yields, on
one hand, almost no variation for an increase in the number
of network nodes and a linear variation with network diam-
eter. These properties are essential to any solution that must
take into account situations where the number of nodes in a
grid increases over time. Please cite this article as: Martijn Warnier et al., Distributed monitori
grids, International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection (2017),Another experiment investigated the influence of the time-
to-live of the negative fields on convergence and scalability.
This experiment employed a random geometric graph of a 10-
hop network with 1000 to 5000 nodes and varied the time-to-
live for negative values between 500 and 10,000 (the values of
half of the nodes were changed randomly after initial network
convergence). The results in Fig. 5 confirm Lemma 1 with re-
spect to the log T term. Specifically, the data shows that the
convergence time is affected very little by the choice of pa-
rameters. As expected, the network diameter has a larger in-
fluence. 
4.4. Robustness metric computation 
Fig. 6 shows the performance of the distributed computation
method on real data sets created in the manner described
in Section 4.1 . The figure shows the results of two simula-
tion runs involving the distributed algorithms versus the re-
sults obtained by centralized computations (ground truth).
The length of the value vector varies from 1000 values to
10,000 values and each point represents network data after
convergence. The results confirm that the precision can be set
to the desired value independent of the network topology and
size. 
When using a vector of 1000 elements, a mean relative er-
ror of 3% was obtained (maximum relative error 11% with a
standard deviation of 2.6%). A larger vector (10,000 elements)
produced a mean relative error of 1% (maximum relative errorng for the prevention of cascading failures in operational power 
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cf 4% with a standard deviation of 0.8%). These results are ex- 
ellent, especially when considering that they were obtained 
rom a combination of distributed computations with all the 
ault-tolerant mechanisms enabled. 
Fig. 6 also incorporates a line at robustness value R CF = 0 . 67
hat corresponds to a critical threshold set by grid operators.
f the robustness metric drops below this value, then a power 
ine failure can lead to a blackout that affects more than 20% of 
he power grid. The threshold value was obtained by running 
ascading failure simulations of the IEEE 118 system using tar- 
eted attacks (i.e., worst-case scenario). Interested readers are 
eferred to [27] for a structured methodology for determining 
uch thresholds. 
The critical threshold (which affects more than 20% of the 
ower grid) is more or less arbitrary and was chosen purely 
or illustrative purposes. In practice, several factors have to be 
onsidered by grid operators (e.g., line capacities and main- 
enance cycles) to determine realistic threshold values. Nev- 
rtheless, the results illustrate the feasibility of the proposed 
pproach because they clearly demonstrate that the error rate 
f the distributed algorithm is much lower than the minimal 
equired drop in robustness needed to meet the threshold. 
Finally, it is important to note that the proposed approach 
iffers from traditional approaches that attempt to capture 
he global state of a network and then make decisions cen- 
rally (this is discussed in the next section). The proposed ap- 
roach pushes the computations of the robustness metric in 
he network and the results are available at each node as soon t
Please cite this article as: Martijn Warnier et al., Distributed monitori
grids, International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection (2017),s the computations converge. This mechanism can be readily 
sed in the measurement phase, leading to the possibility of 
mplementing distributed control loops on top of it. 
. Monitoring cascading failures in power 
rids 
esearch related to monitoring the state of a power grid can 
e divided into three main areas: (i) metrics that quantify the 
ulnerability of power grids to cascading failures; (ii) simula- 
ion models that predict the impacts of node/line outages; and 
iii) sensor networks that capture the operative states of power 
rids. 
A significant body of work exists on metrics for assessing 
he vulnerability of power grids to cascading failures. Most 
tudies employ a purely topological or extended topologi- 
al approach that primarily rely on graph-theoretic measures 
uch as betweenness [40] or other centrality measures [37] .
owever, these studies (see, e.g., [7,8,11,22] ) focus on the topo- 
ogical properties of power grids and fail to consider the oper- 
tive states of the grids. In effect, this means that the metrics 
annot be used to assess the changes in the vulnerability of 
n operational power grid. 
Other researchers (see, e.g., [4,44] ) have proposed measures 
hat rely on simulation models. Although, these metrics in- 
orporate the operative state of a power network in addition 
o its topology, it is very challenging to use the metrics to ng for the prevention of cascading failures in operational power 
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 quantify the resilience of the network to cascading failures in
(near) real-time because the computations require full knowl-
edge of the power grid state in order to simulate cascading
failures. Previous work by the authors of this paper [24,25] is
a notable exception. This is because it defines a metric that
considers the topology and the operative state of a power
grid while eliminating computationally-expensive tasks as in
[31] or computing the complete network state in order to sim-
ulate cascading failures. 
Grid operators traditionally assess network operations us-
ing flow-based simulation models (e.g., N−x contingency anal-
ysis [38] ). These models consider the operational behavior of a
power grid. Grid operators can calibrate the models to match
the power grid of interest and run various scenarios to assess
the impacts of the failure of one or two lines. However, these
models have two problems. First, they depend on the knowl-
edge of grid operators who determine the failure scenarios
that are to be explored. Second, the computational complex-
ity of the simulation models render them infeasible in failure
scenarios involving more than two components (i.e., N−2 con-
tingency analysis). Interested readers are referred to [17] for an
overview of contingency analysis methods for power grids. 
Several schemes have been suggested for addressing the
limitations of traditional contingency analysis methods. For
example, Mittal et al. [31] have proposed a probabilistic con-
tingency analysis scheme for power grids that allows contin-
gency analysis up to eight levels deep (i.e., concurrent fail-
ures of up to eight nodes). Other researchers, such as YanPlease cite this article as: Martijn Warnier et al., Distributed monitori
grids, International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection (2017),et al. [42] , attempt to address the computational challenges
by dividing a large power grid into smaller sub-grids (clus-
ters) and running a separate contingency analysis on each
of the smaller grids. By automatically adapting the sub-grid
clusters over time based on different threat analysis scenarios
and grid states, Yan et al. are able to perform detailed analy-
ses of more realistic threats. Note that such approaches are
generally better at dealing with more likely threat scenarios
at the cost of ignoring less likely threat scenarios that might
involve large impacts on a power grid. In contrast, the moni-
toring approach proposed in this paper considers all possible
threats to the power grid at the same time based on the grid
topology and state. This enables the determination of when
a threat is more imminent without identifying the most vul-
nerable nodes. Thus, the approach complements contingency
analysis approaches and could be used in conjunction with
current grid operator practices. 
Numerous researchers have specified distributed archi-
tectures for monitoring the state of a power grid. However,
the architectures typically focus on data collection related
to the loading levels of power lines, phase angles, etc. (see,
e.g., [3,16,18,28,33,43,45,46] ). Unfortunately, they do not use so-
phisticated data aggregation mechanisms to quantify the re-
silience of a power grid to cascading failures. 
In conclusion, as far as the authors of this paper are aware,
no power grid monitoring approaches are available that can –
in near real-time – assess the vulnerability of an operational
power grid to cascading failures. ng for the prevention of cascading failures in operational power 
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[. Conclusions 
his paper has introduced a novel distributed computation 
pproach for assessing the resilience of an operational power 
rid to cascading failures in near real-time. The approach 
everages a class of fast gossip algorithms [9] with self- 
tabilizing mechanisms for handling run-time network dy- 
amics. The effectiveness of the approach is demonstrated 
y computing the robustness to cascading failures metric 
24,25] in a rapid and reliable manner for a case study involv- 
ng the benchmark IEEE 118 Power System. 
The distributed computation approach has a number of 
esirable properties, most notably scalability and robustness.
imulation results performed with real and synthetic data 
emonstrate that the approach achieves very fast conver- 
ence times, influenced primarily by the network diameter 
nd only logarithmically by the number of network nodes.
his property is very important in smart grids because the 
umbers of nodes deployed in grids that cover regions or 
ountries are expected to increase over the next few decades.
The precision of the computations can be set by adjusting 
he size of the messages exchanged in a network. This is a 
rucial property for scalability because message size is not a 
unction of the number of network nodes. More importantly,
he computation error scales as O (1/ poly ( N )), meaning that the 
reater the number of network nodes, the lower the final error.
inally, the approach preserves anonymity because it does not 
equire unique identifiers for the network nodes. 
The principal result is that it is possible to compute com- 
lex aggregates of the operational states of power grid nodes 
n a fully distributed manner rapidly (in near real-time) and 
eliably. Because automatic control systems always require 
easurements, the proposed approach is a perfect candidate 
or the measurement block of an automated distributed con- 
rol scheme. While this paper has focused on the measure- 
ents of network properties, future research will investigate 
he actuation portion that is triggered by the availability of dif- 
erent power grid metrics. 
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